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Introduction
"A new breed of investor, more informed, more inquisitive, more
cynical, more in touch with our markets than ever before has been
spawned by the Information Age." Arthur Levitt, [former]
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
In February 1999, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled on an
insider trading issue for the first time in its history.2 Judicial
acknowledgment of the importance of insider trading regulations was
a historic event for the Japanese government as a whole. It was a
symbol of triumph in the battle against the insider trading problem
that had plagued the Japanese financial markets for decades. With
this ruling, it appeared that all the branches of the Japanese
government were finally working synergistically to overcome years of
bureaucracy, societal indifference, and other obstacles in addressing
the lingering insider trading problem.
Now, the Japanese government could be facing new problems.
As the Internet spreads in acceptance across Japan3 and new forms of
communication technology continue to be created, insider trading
enforcement may take a more complex turn. With the rise in
popularity of such technology as online trading, instant messaging,
and chat rooms, the insider trader can now realize profits for himself
or others through means that are increasingly difficult to detect.
Several high-profile cases in the United States indicate how easily
these technologies can be abused to further securities crimes on the
Internet.4 With all the recent developments in Japanese business and
1. Sarah Lai Stirland, SEC chairman seeks better best execution
<http://www.redherring.com/insider/1999/l105/inv-bestexec.html> (Nov. 5, 1999) (quoting
Mr. Levitt at the Securities Industry Association's annual conference in Boca Raton,
Florida).
2. Supreme Court Demotes Insider Trading Case, Mainichi Daily News, 12 (Feb. 17,
1999). The Osaka High Court had reversed the conviction of Kazuhiko Takizawa in
October 1997 for selling on inside infromation pertaining to Nippon Shoji Kaisha. The
Japanese Supreme Court concluded that the sale of shares based on information regarding
fatal side effects of certain drugs constituted insider information. A Commentary on the
Securities and Exchange Law: Cases and Theories (Oct. 1999).
3. Twenty-seven million Japanese, or one in five, have Internet connections. Lori
Enos, 7-11 To Tackle E-Commerce, Japanese Style, E-Commerce Times
<http://www.ecommercetimes.com/news/articles2000/000622-6.shtml> (June 22, 2000). In
addition, 30.5% of all Japanese households went online in September 2000. See Survey
explores Japanese web use, SiliconValley.com, <http://www.mercurycenter.com/svtech/
news/breaking/ap/docs/4748001.htm> (Oct. 3, 2000).
4. For example, in October 2000, Mark S. Jakob, a former community college
student, was indicted after allegedly selling short 3,000 shares of Emulex Corp. borrowed
from an online brokerage, fabricating a press release that the Emulex president would
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technology relating to the Internet,5 one may think that the Japanese
government may be adjusting to the changes of the digital age.
However, if the regulation restricting the role of the Internet in public
disclosure of material information is any evidence,6 the Japanese
government could be falling far behind the times.
This note will explore the impact of Internet and communication
technology on the insider trading problem in Japan in three parts.
First, it will briefly present the historical problems of securities
regulation in Japan. Second, it will generally discuss Japanese insider
trading law. Third, this note will present the challenges current
technology creates for the insider trading problem in Japan.
I
Historical Obstacles To Effective Insider Trading Regulation
Throughout most of the 20th century, Japanese corporate
ownership remained largely out of reach of private investors. At the
conclusion of World War II, the Allied Forces ordered the dissolution
of the large corporate conglomerates that had dominated the
Japanese financial landscape As a result, shares previously held by
holding companies were finally made available to the general public.'
Despite this attempt to create a more democratic marketplace, the
Japanese marketplace remained effectively closed for decades due to
corporate reliance on indirect financing techniques, such as bank
borrowing.9 Even with the rise of public securities trading in the
1970s, corporate cross-shareholding under the keiretsu system, where
several interconnected companies are arranged around a central
bank, preserved the status quo.1
resign and the company was under investigation, and causing the press release to be
released over the news wires. E.g., SEC Litigation Release No. 16747, Federal Judge
Grants Preliminary Injunction, Continues Asset Freeze in SEC Case Involving Emulex
Hoax <http://www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/lr16747.htm> (Oct. 3, 2000).
5. NTT DoCoMo's IMode service, for example, launched in Feb. 1999, has 14
million subscribers, more than 10 percent of the Japanese population. NTT DoCoMo is
expanding. It has partial ownership of a European telecommunications company and has
current plans to build a subsidiary and research facility in Europe. Bruno Giussani, Attack
Mode, The Industry Standard, Nov. 6, 2000 <http://www.thestandard.com/article/display
/0,1151,19868,00.html>.
6. See Robert A. Prentice, The Internet and Its Challenges for the Future of Insider
Trading Regulation, 12 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 263, 283 n. 91 (1999) (citing Yoshiharu Ohi, For
Corporate Data, It's Plug In or Lose Out, The Nikkei Weekly 7 (October 28,1996)).
7. See Hiroshi Oda, Japanese Law 29 (2d ed. 1992).
8. Id. at 268




As Japanese business began to flourish and expand into the
global economy in the 1980s, many foreign investors began to
challenge the inequities of the Japanese financial markets.1 Insider
trading was rampant, and many outside investors were denied
investment opportunities. Pressure from foreign countries helped to
bring about changes in the Japanese marketplace. The Japanese
government abolished foreign exchange and investment controls.12 It
liberalized the financial markets by reciprocating opportunities for
foreign subsidiaries. 3 More significantly, the Japanese government
dissolved the main-bank system, thus increasing equity financing (i.e.,
reducing the debt/equity ratio in all listed companies).
Even after adoption of these reforms, insider trading remained a
persistent problem. Several different societal factors likely
contributed to its prevalence. Political influence, pressure from the
major securities firms, and inaction by the securities enforcement
agency all played a role. 4 However, it is more likely that the Japanese
legislative process (controlled by bureaucrats who draft over an
estimated ninety percent of the legislation passed by the Diet," the
Japanese national legislature, and who have historically thwarted
reform) acted as the most significant impediment to the
implementation of effective insider trading regulation. 6
In 1987, a highly publicized insider trading scandal forced the
hand of the Japanese government. Tateho Kagaku Kogyo K.K., a
Japanese magnesium company, lost 23 billion yen in the
governmental bond market. A day before the public announcement
of these losses, the Hanshin Sogo Bank, one of the principal
shareholders in Tateho, sold all of its shares in the company and
thereby avoided extensive losses. 7 The humiliating publicity from the
Tateho scandal forced the Japanese government to re-evaluate its
securities regulations. 8
In 1988, the Japanese Diet passed amendments to the nation's
securities laws, the Shoken Torihikiho, to strengthen its insider
11. See Harald Baum, Japanese Capital Markets: New Legislation, 22 Law in Japan
1-2 (1989).
12. See id. at 2.
13. Id.
14. See Shen-Shin Lu, Are the 1988 Amendments to Japanese Securities Regulation
Law Effective Deterrents to Insider Trading?, 1991 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 179, 194 (1991).
15. See Gregory D. Ruback, Master of Puppets: How Japan's Ministry of Finance
Orchestrates Its Own Reformation, 22 Fordham Int'l L.J. 185, 194 (1998).
16. See Lu, supra n. 14, at 195.
17. Baum, supra n. 11, at 20.
18. See Lu, supra n. 14, at 195 n. 65.
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trading rules. The following year, the Japanese cabinet passed an
administrative order approving the details of the new insider trading
regulations.' 9 These changes, however, suffering from textual
ambiguity, failed to serve as a useful prosecutorial vehicle. ° In fact, in
the first seven years after the passage of the amendments, the
Ministry of Finance secured only one conviction for insider trading.21
Instead, the securities enforcement agency relied on doctrines such as
market manipulation to prosecute securities crimes.2 Even if
successful insider trading legislation could have been passed, the
Japanese securities enforcement agency, in general, had been vested
at its inception with inadequate legal authority to tackle a problem as
severe as insider trading.23
Since 1995, the number of convictions has steadily risen. That
year, Japan saw its first criminal punishment of a corporate defendant
for insider trading violations. In 1997, the securities enforcement
agency proposed an expansion to insider trading penalties. 2' Now,
riding momentum from these developments, including the 1999
Supreme Court case, the Japanese government faces the task of
addressing new challenges in insider trading regulation with the
increasing use of Internet and communcation technology in Japanese
society.
II
Insider Trading Law In Japan Generally
Japanese law on insider trading, codified in the Shoken
Torihikiho, follows the U.S. statutory and common law schemes in
some respects.26 Under U.S. law, four general classes of individuals
19. David E. Sanger, Japan Adopts Insider Trading Regulations, N.Y. Times D6
(Feb. 1, 1989).
20. One representative of the Ministry of Finance stated, "It is impossible to
prosecute unless [public disclosure and other terms] are defined." Id.
21. Note, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan: Introducing a Private Right of
Action, 73 Wash. U. L.Q. 1399, 1403 n. 26 (1995).
22. Collusive practices by various executives to manipulate increases in share prices
violated Article 125 and other provisions, resulting in findings of guilt. See Judgment of
Tokyo Dist. Ct., Keishu 16-7/8-556 (1984); see also Judgment of Dist. Ct., Hanji 1020-129
(1981), both reported in Oda, supra n. 7, at 312.
23. See Part III Sec. 1, infra, for further discussion on the problems of enforcement.
24. Bank, Marubeni Affiliate Fined For Insider Trading, Mainichi Daily News 14
(Mar. 26, 1995).
25. MOF to Lengthen Jail Time for Investment Crimes, Mainichi Daily News 12
(Sep. 6, 1997).
26. In the U.S., the common law rule can be stated as follows: "certain individuals
who are knowingly in possession of material non-public information relating to a company
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prohibited from insider trading exist: traditional insiders, temporary
insiders, misappropriators, and tippers or tippees" Similar
classifications can be applied in Japanese law although under
different legal doctrines. For example, Japanese temporary insiders
are brought within the scope of the law under privity of contract
rather than a broader fiduciary relationship."
The standard of materiality varies between the United States and
Japan because of the precise nature of the Japanese civil law code.
The Shoken Torihikiho meticulously enumerates the wide range of
information that can be considered "material," including everything
from issuances of stock to material change in net income due to
revised sales projections.29 By contrast, the Supreme Court held that
materiality exists when there is "a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider [the information] important
in deciding how to vote. '
The remedial structure of both nations could be the most
disparate aspect of the two systems. Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, the Securities and Exchange Commission is granted
broad authority to seek civil penalties and enjoin violative acts." The
Department of Justice can also seek criminal proceedings that could
result in penalties of $1 million and/or imprisonment for ten years.
must disclose such information prior to trading the company's securities... [or else]
refrain from trading." International Insider Dealing 7 (Mark Stamp & Carson Welsh, eds.,
FT Law & Tax 1996). The Japanese rule, set forth in Article 190-2 of the Shoken
Torihikiho, may be defined in this way: an insider transaction occurs when "persons
having a certain, specifically defined contractual or legal relationship to the company, or
those who had such a relationship within the past 12 months, and who on the basis of their
position in or relationship to the company received in a certain manner specifically
defined, important information, have conducted trades in shares or other papers of the
relevant company before such information became generally available." Baum, supra
n. 11, at 22, 23.
27. See Stamp & Welsh, supra n. 26, at 8-15.
28. See Shoken Torihikiho Art. 190-2, Para. 1(4) (1989), translation published in
Kazumi Okamura & Chieko Takeshita, Laws and Regulations Relating to Insider Trading
in Japan 12-18 (Commercial Law Center 1989); compare United States v. Chiarella, 445
U.S. 222 (1980) (holding that print shop employee was not in fiduciary relationship with
the target company and, therefore, did not have a duty to abstain or disclose information
before trading).
29. See Shoken Torihikiho Art. 190-2, Paras. 2(1)(a), 3 (1989), translation published
in Okamura & Takeshita, supra n. 28, at 14-16. Interestingly, the Tokyo Stock Exchange
recently announced that information pertaining to the mergers and acquisitions of the
subsidiaries of listed firms would be also actionable for insider trading purposes. TSE
Distributes Insider- Trading Rules, The Nikkei Weekly, Nov. 6, 2000.
30. TSC Industries v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
31. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1995).
32. Id. § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. §78 ff.
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These penalties can be extended to $2,500,000 for companies found
criminally liable.33 Under the Japanese system, criminal sanctions for
insider traders "consist of a maximum fine of 500,000 yen and/or
imprisonment of six months or less."'
III
Problems Created By Technology In Insider Trading
Regulation
Current technological developments in the Internet space could
complicate insider trading regulation in Japan in three main areas of
law: 1) trade execution; 2) tipping; and 3) disclosure.
1. Trade Execution
Online trading is growing exponentially in Japan. With the recent
deregulation in retail brokerage, online trading accounts were
estimated to reach 500,000 by the end of 2000."5 While this figure is
dwarfed by current online trading activity in the United States,36
fueling the Japanese appetite for securities" is the over $10 trillion in
personal savings, much of which the Japanese are said to have
traditionally kept in low-interest or no-interest savings accounts.38
With these figures, the potential problems with respect to
controlling online trading might be readily apparent. With increased
access to the securities markets, the potential insider trader will face
fewer barriers in executing fast and easy illegal trades. The Japanese
government has expressly acknowledged online trading as a primary
reason behind the need for strengthened insider trading rules.39 Two
different factors, however, may complicate the problem. First and
more obviously, the speed at which material information is now being
33. Id.
34. Baum, supra n. 11, at 24. Expansion of these penalties was proposed in 1997.
35. Rob Guth, Japan Discovers Online Trading, The Industry Standard
<http://www.thestandard.con/article/ display/ 0,1151,6164,00.html> (Sep. 3, 1999).
36. There are approximately seven million people investing in domestic securities
markets via online trading accounts. Katrina Booker, They Want You Wired: Brokerage
Firms of All Kinds are Tripping Over Themselves to Compete Online for Customers,
Fortune 113 (Dec. 20, 1999).
37. In 1998, individual investors "accounted for 25.4% of all stocks of listed
companies in Japan, up 7% from five years earlier. Those of financial institutions
decreased to 39.3%, down 10% from 1993." Natsuko Segawa, Net Results, The Nikkei
Weekly 3 (June 19, 2000).
38. Guth, supra n. 35.
39. See The Securities and Exchange Counsil [sic], Comprehensive Reform of the
Securities Market <http://www.mof.go.jp/english/tosin/ela505.htm> (June 13, 1997).
2000]
disseminated among companies and their partners enables a greater
number of insiders to act more quickly on the information.' Second,
nearly one-third of Japanese companies do not have policies that
expressly forbid its employees from acting on this information, once
received.4
The absence of clear policies prohibiting insider information in
many companies points to a deeper cultural condition at the heart of
the Japanese insider trading problem.42 Historically, many who acted
on material inside information did not even know they were
committing a crime. To some, perhaps this course of action might
have appeared to be the natural or even prudent thing to do. In this
way, Japan's lack of commitment to educate the public about the
deleterious effects of insider trading on the marketplace and investor
confidence has preserved a sense of cultural complicity in this area.
Furthermore, online trading - and the unmonitored nature of the
Internet - create a sense of anonymity that may embolden potential
insider traders to act instinctively and rashly. Without the need to
interact with brokers, insiders can trade immediately and
subsequently monitor the results as often as they like. This notion can
be evidenced in recent stock manipulation cases in the United States.
In September 2000, 15-year old Jonathan Lebed settled charges
brought by the SEC for stock manipulation.43 Operating under a
custodial online brokerage account, Lebed allegedly made a total
$272,826 in a classic "pump and dump" scheme." After buying thinly
traded microcap stocks for typically under a dollar each, Lebed
accessed Yahoo! message boards under different aliases and seeded
them with 200 to 300 identical messages claiming, among other things,
that those stocks were grossly undervalued.4"
40. In one example in the U.S., an engineer at a technology company bought a call
options contract upon receiving a "company-wide" email sent by executives regarding
plans for new business. Dawn Kawamoto, Former Nvidia Engineer Charged with Insider
Trading, CNET News.com <http://news.cnet.com/news//0-1006-200-2644877.html> (Aug.
29, 2000).
41. See Insider-trading loopholes remain in some companies, The Nikkei Weekly
(Oct. 16, 2000).
42. In the early 1990s, insider trading was so pervasive that one prominent political
commentator characterized Japan as "a society of insider dealings." James Sterngold,
Stock Scandal in Japan Runs Deep, N.Y. Times 29 (Feb. 1, 1991).
43. Ronna Abramson, SEC Tells Teen to Pay Up, The Industry Standard
<http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,18710,00.html> (Sep. 22, 2000).
44. Id.
45. Id. In the case of Lebed and other pump-and-dump traders, the message boards
are an ideal vehicle for their crimes because these services do not require individuals to
register their real names. In the insider trading scenario, verified identification is not as
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Japanese insider traders may have good reason to believe that
their activities will go largely unnoticed. Japan simply lacks the
enforcement capability to police illegal online trading effectively. The
Ministry of Finance arguably continues to exist in the disempowered
form in which it was created during the post-Occupation re-
development.46 In comparison with the SEC, its securities agency is
vested with little authority and armed with relatively small civil and
criminal penalties. The Japanese government has no counterpart to
the SEC's Office of Internet Enforcement, which identifies areas of
surveillance, formulates investigative procedures, and conducts
Internet investigations and prosecutions.47 As a result, despite recent
high-profile off-line convictions, public sentiment among the
Japanese as to the enforceability of insider trading on the Internet
likely remains skeptical.
2. Tipping
Unlike U.S. law, "subtippee" liability does not exist under the
Shoken Torihikiho. Under U.S. law, an insider is liable for tipping
material nonpublic information if he anticipates some personal
benefit from the disclosure.4 Tippees can be held liable if the tipper
breached a duty and the tippee knew that the tipper was breaching
the duty.49 Presumably, the duty to abstain or disclose could be passed
down a chain of tippees indefinitely, and individual liability could be
attached to each who breached that duty. Under Japanese law, the
tipping rule provides that no person to whom an insider has
communicated a material fact may trade on that company's stock
until the information has been publicly disclosed." Thus, the
possibility that liability can be extended to those removed from the
original "source" of information under U.S. law can be contrasted
much of an issue. Online brokerages generally require users to complete detailed
application forms before receiving accounts.
46. Lu, supra n. 14, at 182 (implying that the Japanese might have harbored
resentment with regard to the "overreaching occupation provisions" and that this
sentiment played a part in the abolition of the initial Japanese securities agency and
creation of its replacements).
47. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Internet Enforcement Program
<http://www.sec.gov> (visited Oct. 14, 2000). As further points of comparison, the SEC
brought its first case to charge the use of the Internet to pass inside information in March
of 2000 and has brought more than 180 Internet-related enforcement actions to date. Id.
48. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
49. SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 766 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (holding eavesdropper is
not liable for trading on overheard information regarding liquidation of company).
50. Shoken Torihikiho, Art. 190-2, Para. 3, translation published in Okamura &
Takeshita, supra n. 28, at 16.
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with a mere "direct communication" standard under Japanese law.
The implications from the limitations of this rule are far-
reaching. Today, the individual has a panoply of media at his or her
disposal that can disseminate information to a seemingly unlimited
number of recipients: instant messaging, webcasting, message boards,
email, wireless messaging, etc. Put one way, the combined circulations
of the Wall Street Journal and USA Today at approximately 3.4
million still "fall[s] short of the 'self-publishing' reach available to
someone who joins a few commercial bulletin board services."5'
Under the direct communication standard, only the outsider who has
received the material information from an insider can be held liable,
even if the outsider turns around and emails the same information to
hundreds of his or her friends. While broad dissemination technology
such as message boards or webcasting might not have been
reasonably anticipated during the 1988 amendments, the Japanese
government might face serious problems if the direct communication
standard is not scrutinized for amendment.
3. Disclosure
The issues of tipping and disclosure of material information are
closely related under Japanese law because both are addressed by the
same general rule: No person to whom an insider has communicated a
material fact may trade on that company's stock until the information
has been publicly disclosed." New challenges to the interpretation of
this dislosure requirement in the advent of widespread
communication technologies arise in two areas: a) selective disclosure
and b) prohibited Internet disclosure.
A. Selective Disclosure
Selective disclosure is the preferential distribution of material
information by corporate management to analysts and other
institutional figures before broader market disclosure. 3 The concern
raised by selective disclosure is the unfair disadvantage to individual
investors, who are deprived of the opportunity to act on breaking
news, but are affected by the change in stock value as a result of
51. Prentice, supra n. 6, at 282 n. 86 (quoting from North American Securities
Administrator Association website).
52. Shoken Torihikiho, Art. 190-2, Para. 3, translation published in Okamura &
Takeshita, supra n. 28, at 16.
53. Brobeck Phleger & Harrison LLP, The SEC Adopts Rules To Regulate How
Public Companies Deal With Analysts And Insider Trading, Brobeck Securities Law Alert
<http://www.brobeck.com/articles/seclit/0800sec-update.pdf> (Aug. 2000).
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immediate institutional trading.
Previously, U.S. companies could use selective dislosure as a
means to satisfy the disclosure standard. 4 As Professor Robert A.
Prentice has stated, "Technology has enabled companies to
simultaneously fax-broadcast the full text to 100, 300, 500 or more of
the company's closest followers among investment analysts and
money managers worldwide."5 In August 2000, however, the SEC
adopted Regulation FD. This rule requires that when an issuer
chooses to disclose material information, he must do so through
public disclosure and that when an issuer learns that it has made an
inadvertent selective disclosure it must make public disclosure within
24 hours. 6
Japanese law does not carry similar limitations on selective
disclosure.57 Under the Shoken Torihikiho, disclosure is satisfied at a
minimum when "many persons [are enabled to have] access to such
facts."58  However, disclosure has been interpreted to mean
publication "in at least two different news media recognized by the
Law."59 Once publication occurs, two additional provisions apply. The
recipient of the information must wait twelve hours before making
use of the information, and the issuer must notify the stock exchanges
of the disclosure "without delay. '
Legislating new rules to address this problem does not
necessarily impose difficult obstacles. Certain web-based technologies
can serve as easy and effective tools to meet the disclosure
requirement. In the U.S., for example, webcasting can partially satisfy
the public disclosure standard.6' With falling costs, expanding
capabilities and consumer demand, web-based technology is
becoming a more popular method for communications with
investors.62 Thus, the Japanese government can capitalize on these
54. Prentice, supra n. 6, at 280.
55. Id.
56. Brobeck, supra n. 53.
57. While the extent of the interconnection between the Japanese investment analyst
community and the companies they cover is not explored here, it is presumed that there is
a significant interrelation between the two due to the modernization of the Japanese
financial industry and its reception of Western models.
58. Shoken Torihikiho, Art. 190-2, Para. 4, translation published in Okamura &
Takeshita, supra n. 28, at 16.
59. Baum, supra n. 11, at 23, 24.
60. Baum, supra n. 11, at 24.
61. Brobeck, supra n. 53.
62. James Christie, SEC says Internet will make investors equal to analysts, Red
Herring <http://www.redherring.com/industries/2000/0929/ind-secpush092900.html> (Sep.
20001
increasingly affordable and available technologies to begin creating
more equality in the marketplace for the individual investors.
B. Prohibited Internet Disclosure
A unique aspect of the Japanese law involves Internet disclosure.
As stated before, companies cannot place material information on the
Internet until twelve hours after publication in the news media.63 In
addition, no person to whom an insider has communicated a material
fact may trade on that company's stock until the information has been
publicly disclosed.64 Thus, Internet surfers that read important
information that a company releases (such as in a corporate website)
before the twelve-hour window officially closes and then
subsequently acts upon it can be held liable for insider trading.65
While these rules might be appreciated because it ends up
protecting those without access to technology in the same way that
Regulation FD serves to protect individual investors against the
advantages of the institutional investors, these rules might also be
turning Japanese insider trading law into an anachronism. While the
case may be made that in the U.S., the distribution of information
over the Internet is a "selective and arguably discriminatory"
process,66 as the data presented in this note shows,67 the digital divide
in Japan seems to be closing at a much faster pace than in the U.S.
Furthermore, having rules like these on the books may serve to stifle
foreign investments. For example, a European investor may have a
harder time staying competitive in the Japanese marketplace since it
might be financially unfeasible, if not impossible, to track down the
latest editions of Japanese newpapers as they come out. Moreover, he
might not even invest in the Japanese market at all were he to find
out that he would face liability under Japanese law for accessing the
websites of companies in his portfolio and trading prematurely. But,
hypotheticals aside, the fallacies of the Japanese securities law system
actually seem to preserve the status quo for foreign investors. As one
29, 2000).
63. Prentice, supra n. 6, at 283 n. 92 (citing Tatsuya Inoue, Internet: Convenient
Medium or Unfair Trading Edge? Immediate Release of Corporate Data May Lead to
Insider Trading, Authorities Warn, The Nikkei Weekly 12 (Dec. 11, 1995)).
64. Shoken Torihikiho, Art. 190-2, Para. 3, translation published in Okamura &
Takeshita, supra n. 28, at 16.
65. Prentice, supra n. 6, at 283 n. 92 (citing Tatsuya Inoue, Internet: Convenient
Medium or Unfair Trading Edge? Immediate Release of Corporate Data May Lead to
Insider Trading, Authorities Warn, The Nikkei Weekly 12 (Dec. 11, 1995)).
66. Prentice, supra n. 6, at 283.
67. E.g., supra nn. 3, 5.
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Ministry of Finance official admitted, the Japanese government
simply does not have the resources to distinguish between




In summary, Japanese securities law is currently at a crossroads.
In the 1980s, the Japanese government acted to remedy the inequities
of the financial markets only when economic expansion and insider
trading scandals forced the passage of reform. Today, with the current
technology boom of the Internet and wireless communications
creating new markets, like "Mothers,"'69 the Japanese government
should not wait for the threat of further international pressure but
rather capitalize on laudable developments in its judicial
decisionmaking and recent success in criminal prosecutions to form
new laws that adequately protect the marketplace from insider
trading.
68. Segawa, supra n. 37, at 3.
69. "Mothers" is the Market of the High-Growth and Emerging Stocks. See Megan
Barnett, Japan's Bubble Trouble, The Industry Standard <http://www.thestandard.com/
article/display/0,1151,13477,00.html> (Apr. 3, 2000).
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